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Abstract
The paper traces the impartial comparative gaze of the Ancient Greeks, in relation to
their ontological understanding of the world, and with respect to the domains of
epistêmê, politics, and paideia, all operating in the field of logos, which underpinned
the life of the democratic polis. The absence of any apocalyptic truth and predefined
historical pathway in the Greeks’ conception of the world, their esteem for intellectual
activity and philosophical inquiry, and their questioning of their laws and institutions
as part of their educational and political life are all, as the paper demonstrates, at the
root of the genesis of cross-cultural comparison in Ancient Greece. The Greeks were
capable of creating cross-cultural comparison because they relativized other
civilizations, as much as they did with their own, in the space of free inquiry and critique
opened up by the democratic polis.
Keywords: Ancient Greece, cross-cultural comparison
Introduction
Ancient Greece was not only the birthplace of historiography but also the place where
impartiality in the way other peoples were viewed and described first emerged. This
statement would sound odd to those who know that the Greeks called foreign peoples
‘barbarians’, since the term indicates that, by definition, the ‘other’ was seen as inferior.
However, barbaros was an onomatopoetic word signifying the incomprehensible to the
Greeks sound of foreign languages (‘bar-bar’), which, even though somewhat
derogatory towards non-Greek speakers, it does not sufficiently describe the Greeks’
perception of the ‘other.’
The word ‘barbarian’ had, basically, two meanings for the Greeks. It described peoples
leading a lawless life, and those foreign peoples living under despotic rule. The first
meaning indicates a common trajectory from lawlessness to organized community,
which applied to all, including the Greeks. Thucydides, for instance, writes that in
earlier times the Greeks bore arms to protect themselves and their habitations.
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This custom ‘was as much a part of everyday life with them as with the barbarians’, and
it was still present in his time, as he notes, amongst some Greek populations which did
not live under the rule of law. 1 The second sense had a direct political content: it
referred to peoples that lacked democratic institutions, namely, to those who never
managed to live without a king or a despot. The latter were for the Greeks aneu logou
(they had no say — as the slaves). As François Hartog writes: ‘The Greek is ‘political’,
in other words free, while the barbarian is ‘royal’ meaning submissive to a master.’2
This political designation of the barbarians, however, did not entail lack of
acknowledgement nor of admiration of their achievements in other domains. Let us just
remember the remarkable preamble of Histories: ‘This is the display of the inquiry of
Herodotus of Halicarnassus, so that things done by man not be forgotten in time, and
that great and marvellous deeds, some displayed by the Hellenes, some by the
barbarians, not lose their glory, including among others what was the cause of their
waging war on each other.’3 Indeed, it is remarkable that an author of the time, who
belonged to a certain nation, considered the achievements of other nations, even of
major enemies, equally glorious and worthy of being commemorated. As Jacob
Burckhardt pointed out, ‘such an idea would not have occurred to an Egyptian or a
Hebrew.’4
Why did this idea occur to Herodotus, to the tragedians, the sophists, and, long before
them, to Homer? In other words, why was the civilization that called foreign peoples
‘barbarians’ at the same time the one that initiated an impartial viewpoint towards other
civilizations, sought to learn about them, acknowledged their particularities and
achievements, and it could even see itself from the others’ perspective? The general
answer, as a number of prominent authors have shown, lies in the fact that Greece was
the first society that, through the creation of the democratic polis, opened up a space of
free inquiry as well as of self-questioning.5 This article is substantiating this thesis with
focus on the emergence in Classical Greece of an impartial cross-cultural or
comparative theory — understood here in its original sense as theôria, namely way of
seeing, observing, examining, judging, or considering.

1

Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (Perseus Digital Library), 1.5.3, 1.6.1 and 1.6.2.
Francois Hartog, ‘The Invention of History: The Pre- History of a Concept from Homer to
Herodotus’. History and Theory, 39.3 (2000), 393.
3
Herodotus, The Histories (Perseus Digital Library), 1.1.0.
4
Jacob Burckhardt, History of Greek Culture (New York: Dover Publications, 2002), 332.
5
See: Hannah Arendt, The Promise of Politics (New York: Schocken Books, 2005); J.- P. Vernant, The
Origins of Greek Thought (New York: Cornell University Press, 1984); Cornelius Castoriadis,
Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy: Essays in Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1991); Christian Meier (2009) A Culture of Freedom: Ancient Greece and the Origins of Europe
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
2
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In particular, the article will substantiate the Ancient Greek impartial look towards other
civilizations, first, in terms of the Greeks’ conception of the world, and, secondly, in
terms of three relevant domains of activity, created by the Greeks: politics, epistêmê
(reasoned knowledge), and paideia (education). What characterizes all three is the rise
of logos, which meant not merely speech or discourse, but dialogue, rational
communication, accounting for, and critique. Politics, knowledge, and education
emerged in Ancient Greece as fields of logos, where different viewpoints were freely
exchanged and debated, and, therefore, they are highly relevant to trace the Greek
comparative gaze.
Ontology and Cultural Relativity
In exploring the Ancient Greek perception of the world, Cornelius Castoriadis discerns
two main, even though not coherent, currents of thought. One, starting with
Parmenides’ einai (being) and culminating with Plato’s eidê (forms), sought to identify
an absolute foundation and rule for human and societal creations. This current has
dominated the centre of Western philosophical tradition. The second one, which existed
also beyond the domain of philosophy, and was more characteristic of the Ancient
Greek worldview, gave emphasis on nomos (law, institution or convention) rather than
on physis (natural condition). This current is present in the Greek myths, in poetry, in
politics, in theatre, in the historiography of Herodotus and Thucydides as well as in the
work of philosophers such as Anaximander, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Democritus and
the sophist movement of the fifth century BCE. The overall idea in this latter current
is that human beings are the creators of their institutions (e.g. customs, language, arts,
polities, and, overall, societies) rather than a supreme being, or any other extra-social
authority.6
At the heart of the Greek social imaginary, Castoriadis locates the ontological stance
according to which the world derived from the chaos, i.e. from void, and it was not the
outcome of divine creation nor premised on the revelation of an absolute truth. Indeed,
in the Greek religion, in contrast to monotheistic traditions, there is no divine
anthropogenesis, namely, a special act of creation of the human being by a
transcendental entity or force. Although religion was an important part of the Greeks’
lives, their gods did not dictate any commandments nor did they provide any dogma
according to which people should live and organise their societies. As also Moses
Finley observed, the Greek gods did not make the world, and thus, they bore no
responsibility for it.7

Cornelius Castoriadis, Ce qui fait la Grece, 1: D’ Homer a Heraclite. Seminaires 1982–1983 (Paris:
Editions du Seuil, 2004).
7
Moses I. Finley, The World of Odysseus (New York: NYRB Classics, 2002).
6
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The world’s origins, as Hesiod writes in Theogony, lie in the chaos. ‘In truth at first
Chaos came to be . . ..’8 Chaos, along with Gaia and Eros, were the elements which
made the world rise. Chaos is where all beings, including supernatural beings,
originate. This conception is similar to Anaximander’s idea of apeiron, meaning the
indeterminate, as the opposite of peras (end, limit, or completion). For Anaximander,
everything comes from apeiron and returns to apeiron. It is an abyss, the source of
non-being and non-meaning, subject to the creation of a cosmos. Cosmos is the worldorder that humans make by creating their institutions or their nomoi.9
It is precisely because the Greeks saw the origins of humanity in chaos, abyss, and nonmeaning, as Castoriadis notes, that they created philosophy, through which they sought
to understand existence, and politics, through which they sought to institute their own
existence as society. It is also because their core ontological notion relativized their
civilization, they sought to understand not only their own but also other civilizations.
In other words, if the Greeks gave their own ‘response’ to the chaos, by creating their
particular institutions, so would the others. Moreover, in examining and questioning
their own creations, a curiosity arose to know about and compare them with those of
the others. Namely, Greek cultural relativity combined the acknowledgement of the
universality as well of the particularity of the human condition.
The Greeks’ relativization of cultures derived from their distinction between nomos and
physis. «. . . τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ» is the phrase attributed
by Diogenis Laertius to the fifth-century BCE philosopher Archelaus, allegedly a
teacher of Socrates. The phrase means that that which is just (δίκαιον) and that which
is unjust (αἰσχρὸν) is not a matter defined by nature, but by convention or, in broader
terms, by the institution of society (νόμῳ). Laertius attributes a similar phrase to
Democritus: «νόμῳ θερμόν, νόμῳ ψυχρόν», meaning that which is warm (θερμόν) and
that which is cold (ψυχρόν), or our sensual perception of taste is a matter of convention,
i.e. of social institution (νόμῳ). 10 Amongst the sophists, Protagoras most prominently
expressed this perception, with his phrase ‘Man is the measure of all things . . .’
(«πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος»). 11 The phrase, as, in fact, the entire
sophist movement, signified not only a move away from religion but also a perception
of the human laws as relative. As Jacqueline de Romilly writes: ‘If man was the
measure of all things, the only justice was his justice, that is to say, his particular idea
of justice, as expressed in his laws.’12 In short, for the Greeks, human beings establish
these conventions as a necessary condition for social and political life.

8

Hesiod, Theogony (Perseus Digital Library), line 115.
Cornelius Castoriadis, Ce qui fait la Grece, 1.
10
See Diogenis Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers (Perseus Digital Library).
11
Mentioned in Plato, Theaetetus (Perseus Digital Library), 170a.
12
Jaqueline de Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 112.
9

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol85/iss85/9

4

Moutsios: The Ancient Greek Roots of Cross-Cultural Comparison

Comparative Civilizations Review

83

The acknowledgement by the Greeks of the particularity of each society is associated
with the absence, even though not complete, of the idea of progress, that characterised
so much European Modernity and impacted the world thereafter. Judging from
Thucydides, quoted above, there was a perception of progress in terms of the transition
from a lawless life to an organized community and its material comforts and technical
achievements. Nevertheless, as John Bury and Ludwig Edelstein pointed out, in
reference to the classical times, the Ancient Greeks had no inclination to discard the old
as inferior nor did they look at the future for perpetual improvements. As Edelstein
writes, ‘once security and stability had been established [...] and once the refinement of
the arts and of knowledge had reached its present level, they did not look forward to
things that would be much better than they were.’13 Similarly, Dodds remarked that the
Greek idea of progress was about technical and scientific achievements but ‘…
thoughtful minds in the fifth century were aware of the limitations imposed on progress
by the human condition.’14 This should be seen in conjunction with the Greeks’ overall
understanding of the role of scientific knowledge, which Geoffrey Lloyd has
particularly underlined. According to Lloyd, although the Greeks created empirical
scientific inquiry, they perceived its role as a means to understand natural phenomena,
not to dominate and exploit nature15 — an idea that emerges in European Modernity
after Descartes and Bacon.
After all, for the Greeks, humans had a distinct but no advantageous position in the
world: they existed in equal distance between the savage life of beasts, and the eternal
and blissful life of gods, a condition that the Golden Race shared too, before Prometheus
confers on them the technical means by which they instituted societies. The ritual of
animal sacrifice to the gods was precisely, according to Jean-Pierre Vernant, a symbolic
marker of this distance. All three parts emerge simultaneously and independently from
the chaos, and they all are subject to Moira.16 Moira, or moros in Homer, is allotment,
share, fortune, rather than destiny or fate. It poses the ultimate end, death, and therefore
it is the realm of limits, of peras, within which one can freely move but not transgress.
Transgression of limits constitutes hubris, the consequence of which is nemesis.17
An idea of progress similar to the modern would mean breaking down these limits and
thus challenging Moira. Besides, we should bear in mind the Greeks’ tragic perception
of life, conveyed by the Hesiodic myths as well as the Athenian tragedy.

13

Ludwig Edelstein, The Idea of Progress in Classical Antiquity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1967), 29. See also: John B. Bury, The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into Its Origin and Growth
(Middlesex: The Echo Library).
14
Eric R. Dodds, The Ancient Concept of Progress and Other Essays on Greek Literature and Belief
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 12.
15
Geoffrey E. R. Lloyd, (1970) Early Greek Science: Thales to Aristotle (London: Chatto and Windus).
16
Jean-Pierre Vernant, Les Jardins d’ Adonis. (Paris: Gallimard, 1972)
17
Cornelius Castoriadis, Ce qui fait la Grece, 1.
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In Works and Days, Pandora opens the jar given to her by the gods and she releases all
evils and harms to humanity, but hope. Hope remained in the jar, which can never be
opened again. In tragic theatre, humans cannot have full control of the meaning of their
actions, and thus they are prone to hubris, i.e. exaggeration, arrogance or excessive
manifestation of power, and, therefore, they should limit their actions — something
that, of course, is entirely antithetical to the imperatives of progress.
Moreover, judging again from Thucydides, we do not find in Greece a perception of
progress that includes the moral character of individuals nor their happiness or
unhappiness. Thucydides remarks that there are ‘human things’ (κατά το ἀνθρώπινον)
that transcend time, namely they are relevant to his contemporaries as much as to his
future readers.18 In other words, there is and there will always be hate, betrayal or
crime, and the fact that a society observes certain moral tenets at a particular historical
age does not entail that they would also be observed by other societies in the present or
the future. The absence of an idea of progress similar to the European one testifies also
for the absence in Ancient Greece of hierarchization of other societies, in accordance to
their degree of ‘advancement’, as, in fact, has been the case in the modern world since
the nineteenth century.
Having looked at the ontological roots of the Greek cultural relativity, the following
sections are tracing it further in the domains of knowledge, politics and education.
Epistêmê and Historein
Knowledge, in Classical Greece, emerged as an activity in the field of logos, shifting
away from dogma, transcendental sources of truth, and transmitters and interpreters of
divine or royal discourses. Logos derives from the verb legô, which indicates the
secularization of speaking, namely the expression of one’s own opinion, rather than the
announcement of a sacred or royal discourse. Thus, knowledge ceased to be esoteric,
the privilege of a social class or a holy figure, and became a common property. It is in
this context that philosophy was born, not as the isolated intellectual activity of wise
individuals or literati residing in the king’s court, but as a public questioning of
established beliefs and institutions. It is also in this context that epistêmê, initially
inseparable from philosophy, was born, as reasoned knowledge, based on examination,
debating, and persuasion by means of kreittôn logos (the strongest argument).
Hence the genesis of history as documentation and research of the past and of foreign
civilizations. History comes from the verb historein, which means to inquire.
Certainly, written accounts of the past did not appear first in Greece. Yet these accounts
did not exhibit a curiosity to discover but a desire to commemorate.

18

Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (Perseus Digital Library), 1.22.4.
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The Egyptians wrote annals that recorded the acts of their kings; in Mesopotamia royal
clerks inscribed the deeds of kings on monuments; the Hebrews reproduced the sayings
and experiences of their great ancestors in sacred books; and for the Indians, history
was their ‘Veda’, which included the revelations of extraordinary or sacred persons to
be learned and repeated in the future by Brahmans. For the Greeks, after the Mycenaean
kingdoms, history was no longer a memorization of royal deeds, nor a holy revelation
nor a preserve of a caste of scribes, but an investigative activity.
As Hartog writes, ‘epistemologically, the Greeks always privileged seeing (over
hearing) as the mode of knowledge. To see, to see for oneself, and to know were one
and the same thing.’ 19 Historein indicates the act of going and seeing first, thus
expressing an approach, rather than a knowledge field. But it also indicates the
readiness to question taken-for-granted traditions and knowledge — a readiness which
could only arise in the context of philosophical reflectiveness that emerged in the Greek
polis. ‘I write what I deem true; for the stories of the Greeks are manifold and seem to
me ridiculous’,20 wrote the first known historian, Hecataeus of Miletus, a phrase that
could not be written by an annals-scribe of an Eastern monarchy or in any culture which
did not allow the direct questioning, let alone rejection, of their traditional knowledge
structures.
Yet, the real rupture in historiography came with Herodotus. Herodotus wrote his
Histories investigating the Greco-Persian wars, but at the same time, he explored
neighbouring civilizations, creating also the disciplines of geography and ethnography
and, for that matter, comparative studies. Especially in the first books (Clio, Euterpe,
Thalia and Melpomene), he makes long references to the customs and institutions of the
countries he visited. Herodotus historei, investigates, but also, as Hartog notes, he sees,
interprets, and reports, or in Greek, sêmainei. Both approaches of historein and
sêmainein are, as Hartog points out, ‘two intellectual tools by which to ‘see clearly’
further, beyond the visible, in space or time.’21 And in doing so, Herodotus recurrently
questions the established knowledge and customs of his own people, through a
remarkably impartial attitude, even with regard to his own people’s customs of god
representation in comparison to those of their traditional enemy, the Persians: ‘It is not
their custom to make and set up statues and temples and altars, but those who do such
things they think foolish, because, I suppose, they have never believed the gods to be
like men, as the Greeks do.’22
Note the use of third person plural pronoun both for the foreign people as well as for
his own.
Francois Hartog, ‘The Invention of History’, 386.
Quoted in: James T. Shotwell, An Introduction to the History of History (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1922), p. 138.
21
Francois Hartog, ‘The Invention of History’, 395.
22
Herodotus, The Histories (Perseus Digital Library), 1.131.1.
19
20
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Hartog, in The Mirror of Herodotus, makes this remark too: although ‘them’ and ‘us’
runs through the Histories, he observes, there is no explicit or implicit viewpoint that
‘us’ represents the truth, a model or the progress that should be achieved by ‘them.’
Nor do the barbarians represent the truth or a natural way of living that should be
imitated by ‘us.’ Further, as the author observes, what is particularly remarkable in the
Herodotean narrative is that ‘them’ and ‘us’ becomes ‘them’ and ‘they’, namely, the
barbarians and the Greeks, or the ‘others’ and the Greeks.23
Herodotus’ historical, ethnographic and comparative inquiry should be seen in the
context of the political, philosophical and educational movements that took place at that
time in Athens, which called into question established traditions and representations.
His inquiry encouraged self-examination and self-reflection with respect to foreign
cultures, and it thus contributed to the overall critical stance that was initiated by these
movements. Let us remember that the writing of the Histories was not an isolated
intellectual activity but they were presented in public performances in various Greek
poleis (e.g., in Athens, Thebes, Corinth and Olympia).24 Herodotean impartiality also
expresses the Greek distinction between physis and nomos, which made him aware that
each culture sets its own conventions over natural reality. Each society has its own
myths, traditions, customs, conventions, institutions and, for that matter, education
systems. Persian boys, Herodotus says, lived amongst the women and were not allowed
into the presence of their fathers until the age of five, so that their fathers would suffer
no grief in case their sons died at this young age. Moreover, he tells us that the
education of the boys spanned from their fifth to their twentieth year and that they were
taught only three things: riding, archery and telling the truth.25
A similar observation is made by Xenophon in Cyropaedia. It is a treatise, with many
fictional elements though, on education in Achaemenid Persia that depicts the principles
and practices under which children and adolescents were socialized, with emphasis on
the upbringing of Cyrus the Great as a ruler, whom Xenophon so much admired.
Xenophon describes a form of education that provides learning of neither literacy nor
of music nor of poetry, but supervision of children’s moral conduct and punishment of
culprits.

23

Francois Hartog, The Mirror of Herodotus: The Representation of the Other in the Writing of History
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 369.
24
See: Reinhold Bichler and Robert Rollinger, Herodot (Hildesheim: Georg Olms AG, 2000).
25
Herodotus, The Histories, 1.136.2.
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In its main part, as also mentioned by Herodotus, it is military training, which in
adolescence, after the sixteenth or seventeenth year, takes place through a form of
preliminary military service to the ruling class (‘these young men are also employed by
the magistrates if garrison work needs to be done . . .’; ‘they present themselves before
the governors for service to the state . . .’; ‘when the king goes out to hunt . . . he takes
half the company with him, and each man must carry bow and arrows’).26
This latter part of youth training marks thereafter their lives as adults: obedience and
service to the state and the rulers. A stark contrast from the values of the Greek paideia.
In other words, Cyropaedia provides another manifestation of the same cognitive
openness that characterised the democratic polis, which allowed everybody, both its
supporters and its adversaries, to inquire about and evaluate ‘barbarian’ institutions
according to their judgement. As Athenian democracy permitted Plato, its major
adversary, to oppose it through his writings and the founding of his Academy, so it
allowed historians like Xenophon, a man of similar to Plato oligarchic convictions, to
praise the political institutions of the traditional enemy of his own people.
Herodotus’ positive judgement of other civilisations, however, does not stem from his
endorsement of despotism and its political or educational practices. His appreciation
of democracy appears in parts of his work, as, after all, it was democracy that allowed
him to write and publicize his history. For example, as he writes in the fifth book, the
Athenians’ achievements show that ‘while they were oppressed, they were, as men
working for a master, cowardly, but when they were freed, each one was eager to
achieve for himself.’27 Negative judgements towards foreign practices or actions are
expressed from the universal perspective towards human conduct that Greece
developed, from Homer down to the Athenian tragedy, e.g., by identifying hubris in the
manifestation of power and force, or the limits of moira.
However, living in democracy was not only about speaking freely on any issue, but also
cultivating one’s ability to acknowledge that this same issue can be seen from different
perspectives, and, by extension, that there are different cultural perspectives.
Politics and Multiplicity of Perspectives
Logos is also the field where politics was realised in Greece. The person who legei
communicates his views, and submits them to critical testing in dialogue with others.
Thus, the rise of politics is inextricably associated with the rise of logos. Jean-Pierre
Vernant calls logos the child of the polis, underlining the inextricable relation between
rational discourse and politics, though it is also true that the polis existed precisely
because logos was made possible.28
26

Xenophon, Cyropaedia, Book 1: C2.
Herodotus, The Histories, 5.78.1.
28
Jean-Pierre Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought.
27
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The democratic polis can best be described in the words of Thucydides, who referred
to the status of Delphi following the Peace of Nicias in 421 BCE, as autonomous,
autodicus, and autotelic.29 Autonomous meant that it was the dêmos that gave laws to
itself, rather than an external force, a ruler or any divine authority.
As Aristotle writes about the Athenians in the late fifth century: ‘They have made
themselves supreme in all fields; they run everything by decrees of the Ekklesia and by
decisions of the dikasteria in which the people are supreme.’30 The public participation
in the dikasteria or the Hêliaia, the Athenians’ court, is what made the polis autodicus.
Aristotle, again, praised this institution as largely incorruptible: …‘the judicial powers
of the Boule have passed to the people, which seems a correct development, for a small
number are more open to corruption by bribery or favours than a large.’ 31 The
democratic polis was, finally, autotelic in the sense that it was self-governed. There
was no executive authority external to the body of citizens. Aristotle defined as citizen
(politês) the person who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial
administration of the polis and to hold some office.32 By doing so, the Athenians realize
what he considers the two principles of the democratic polis: to govern and be governed
in turn; and for one to live as one likes.33
These principles, in fact, describe well the meaning for politics for the Greeks. As
Christian Meier puts it, there were no Greeks before the Greeks, in the sense that they
knew nothing about politics until they created it.34 Politics in the Greek sense does not
refer to the actions of monarchs or statesmen, or to the imposition of a ruler’s decisions
on individuals by force. Coercion and violence have nothing to do with politics; politics
presupposes a space of logos — of dialogue, deliberation, rational argumentation and
questioning — that allows citizens to act together and to change existing or establish
new laws and institutions. This is what Hannah Arendt particularly underlined about
the Greek perception, on which she based her theory of politics against established
modern accounts that equate it with struggles to access the means of violence. 35
Castoriadis emphasised the close relation between philosophy and politics, as thinking
in action by the dêmos, as well as the relation of both to the Greek conception of the
world as originating in the chaos.

29

Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (Perseus Digital Library), 5.18.2.
Aristotle, The Politics and the Constitution of Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), 242, XLI2.
31
Aristotle, The Politics and the Constitution of Athens, 242, XLI2.
32
Aristotle, Politics (1275b, 20 and 1276a, 5).
33
Aristotle, Politics 1317-1318.
34
Christian Meier, The Greek discovery of politics. (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1990).
35
See: H. Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt Publishers, 1969).
30
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Namely, precisely because the Greeks conceived of the world as chaos, they introduced
logos and philosophy, through which they put this world into constant questioning, and
politics, through which questioning was put into practice on a daily basis by the activity
of the dêmos, which thus transformed established or created new institutions.36
The Greeks relativized their institutions, and, by extension the institutions of any
civilization, in the discursive space opened up by the political activity of the dêmos, a
space, in Habermas’ terms, of communicative rationality, namely of unconstrained,
argumentative speech, that allows for the mutual recognition of criticisable validity
claims.37
This discursive space in the democratic polis was made possible through isêgoria (the
equal right and the value of everybody’s speech); peithô (one’s capacity to persuade the
assembly or their interlocutors); and parrhêsia (the citizen’s moral responsibility to
know the truth and speak with absolute sincerity). Parrhêsia was highly important for
the social and political life of the polis and the quality of being a citizen. Euripides
gives us a good illustration of this, in Phoenician Women, when he presents Polyneices
on his return to Thebes describing to his mother Jocasta the difficulties that he faced as
an exile to another polis. What mattered to him, even more than the fact that, initially,
he wandered around hungry and without a shelter, was that he was unable to speak
freely:
Jocasta: Well then, first I ask you what I long to have answered. What is it, to
be deprived of one's country? Is it a great evil?
Polyneices: The greatest; harder to bear than tell.
Jocasta: What is it like? What annoys the exile?
Polyneices: One thing most of all; he cannot speak his mind.
Jocasta: This is a slave's lot you speak of, not to say what one thinks.
Polyneices: The follies of the rulers must be borne.
Jocasta: That too is painful, to join in the folly of fools.
Polyneices: Yet to gain our ends we must serve against our nature.38
It is, therefore, greatly painful, commensurate to the state of a slave, and even ‘against
our nature’ (παρά φύσιν), as Euripides tells us, when one ‘cannot speak his mind’
(οὐκ ἔχει παρρησίαν) and has to endure hierarchy. This was indeed the perception in
the Athens of his time, where power was distributed equally as long as one was a citizen.
Egon Friedell, in his cultural history, accredits the Greeks with ‘a sincerity that has been
lost to a great extent in our society.

36
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They were free from the hypocrisy and prudishness that has permeated all life since the
bourgeoisie has come to power [. . .] they spoke with a magnificent openness, both on
their own and their fellowmen’s private affairs.39
In addition, the political and discursive space of the democratic polis made possible the
acknowledgement that there is more than one view to an issue under consideration,
including different worldviews, something that the Athenian citizens were already
taught about through Homer’s epics and the teachings of the sophists (see below). As
Hannah Arendt writes:
Since for the Greeks the public political space is common to all (koinon), the space
where the citizens assemble, it is the realm in which all things can first be recognised
in their many-sidedness. This ability to see the same thing first from two opposing
sides and then from all sides — an ability ultimately based in Homeric impartiality,
unique in antiquity, and whose passionate intensity is unexcelled even in our own
time — also underlines certain tricks of the Sophists, whose importance in liberating
human thought from the constrictions of dogma we underestimate if, in following
Plato, we condemn them on moral grounds.
The appreciation of parrhesia and the ability to see things in their many-sidedness is
what also Greek historiography expresses, as pointed out earlier with reference to
Herodotus. One should include Thucydides in this tradition, even though his history
was about the Peloponnesian War, considering, for example, his well-known
description of the dialogue between the Athenians and the Melians, who were
eventually destroyed by the Athenians because they wished to remain neutral in the war.
The dialogue, which demonstrates that justice can exist only where there is equality,
but not between competing powers, presents the views of the two sides and an example
of raw truth or parrhêsia, which the Athenians valued in their political life. Overall,
the History of the Peloponnesian War approaches the different camps with the same
impartiality as that of Homer or Herodotus, despite the fact that the Athenians put
Thucydides on trial for his failure as a general in the battle of Amphipolis and exiled
him to Thrace.
Inextricably connected with politics, and thus similarly cultivating a perception of
universality and impartiality towards the ‘other’, was Ancient Greek education, or
paideia.

39
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Paideia and the ‘Other’
The emergence of an impartial gaze towards the ‘other’ was indeed part of the Greek
paideia. Paideia, because of its broad meaning, defies easy translation.
It, certainly, includes the school, which was first created in Ancient Greece, not in the
sense of having a group of learners and an instructor placed in a classroom, something
that existed already in neighboring civilizations, but as an activity associated with the
rise of knowledge that is subject to reasoning and disputation.
As Philip Nemo remarks, only when there was epistêmê, independent of any practical
intent, and an intellectual activity that was free from military, athletic or technical
applications was there a ground to create an institution devoted specifically to this
activity. 40 As also Protagoras put it in the homonymous Platonic dialogue, school
education in Athens was «οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ», not for technical skill, but «ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ», for
paideia, as this befits, Protagoras remarked, the private and the free man.41
Freedom for the Greeks was possible only in the field of politics, where citizens could
define through their democratic institutions, the terms and conditions of their public and
personal life, and, in this regard, paideia was the education of the citizen. Indeed,
Classical Athenians were taught on a daily basis how to rule and be ruled, through the
potential that every citizen had to undertake some public office and to exercise power.
Nevertheless, there was a specific educational movement that emphasized political
education, namely the sophist movement, part of which was, of course, Protagoras, too.
The sophists, mainly metics in an Athens that was open to new knowledge, ushered in
further or higher education as a learning institution. Besides their teaching function,
the sophists were philosophers too, who wrote treatises and placed under philosophical
scrutiny religion, myths, traditions, and the established ideas of the time. In other
words, the sophist movement was indissolubly associated with Athenian democracy
and contributed to its development. Werner Jaeger, in his classic trilogy, Paideia: The
Ideals of Greek Culture underlined this association:
[. . .] the great educational movement, which distinguished the fifth and fourth
centuries and which is the origin of the European idea of culture, necessarily started
from and in the city-state of the fifth century. It aimed, as the Greeks understood it,
entirely at political education, training to serve the polis [. . .].

40
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At any rate, unless the whole population had been given an active part in
government (and that is the basis and one of the distinguishing marks of
democracy), it would have been impossible for the Greeks to ask and answer the
eternal questions which exercised them so deeply at that period of their history and
which they left for posterity to answer in its own way...42

Thus, logos, as talk in citizens’ assemblies, on which the function of democracy was
based, and as philosophy and epistêmê, was at the heart of sophist education.
The sophists cultivated isêgoria (speech equality), parrhesia (speaking with sincerity)
and peithô (the capacity to persuade) by teaching their students a variety of competences
in the domain of logos: to ‘speak well’ (eu legein): to speak fluently; to speak briefly;
to lecture on a topic; to establish the truth by reasoned argumentation (dialectic); to
contest on a matter (eristic); to speak ‘from both sides’ (dissoi logoi); and to see the
same issue from different standpoints (antilogic).
Thereby, according also to Arendt’s observation quoted above, sophist education
contributed to the liberation of thought from dogma as well as to the development of
inter-cultural impartiality, by pointing to the different perspectives that different people
and, by extension, different civilizations may have. At the same though, we can find in
the sophist movement a universal understanding of human nature. As the sophist
Antiphon writes in his treatise On Truth:
We have only to think of things which are natural and necessary to all mankind;
these are available to all in the same way, and in all of these there is no distinction
between barbarian or Greek. For we all breath out into the air by the mouth and the
nostrils, and we laugh when we are pleased in our mind, or we weep when we are
grieved, and we receive sounds with our hearings, and see by the light of our vision,
and we work with our hands, and we walk with our feet . . . 43
This remarkable perception of the human condition as universal was already present in
Homer, who ‘educated Greece’ («τὴν Ἑλλάδα πεπαίδευκεν»), in Plato’s expression, for
generations. Indeed, Homer’s poems were for centuries central to the ethical
socialization of children and adults in Antiquity, and, thus, an essential part of the Greek
paideia. The epics highlighted the ethical and emotional world of the individual and
the tragic conditions in which they can find themselves, as well as values and
characteristics that potentially concern everyone, regardless of war camp or ethnicity:
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aretê and aristeia, as the pursuit and accomplishment of excellence; kleos, as
recognition and glory; dikê, as justice; kalokagathia, as beauty and goodness; moira, as
destiny and acceptance of mortality; hubris, as exaggeration and arrogance, nemesis, as
retribution; and inter-cultural impartiality, which, as Arendt correctly observed, was
found, first time, in Homer: ‘This had happened nowhere before; no other civilization,
however, splendid, has been able to look with equal eyes upon friend and foe, upon
success and defeat — which since Homer have not been recognized as ultimate
standards of men’s judgment, even though they are ultimates for the destinies of men’s
lives.’44 In fact, as Thucydides writes, in Homer’s epics there is not even naming and
distinction between Greeks and barbarians.45
The Homeric epics as well as mythology, in general, constituted the ‘raw material’ of
another creation of the Greek paideia, tragedy, which was a particular Athenian
creation.
Tragedy was part of the Athenian paideia, in the sense that it educated the population
in democratic thinking and practice, as well as in the exploration and understanding of
the human condition. As Paul Cartledge writes in The Cambridge Companion to Greek
Tragedy, since formal schooling was a limited reality in Classical Athens, for ‘average
citizens, tragic theatre was an important part of their learning to be active participants
in self-government by mass meeting and open debate between peers.’46 Hence, the
themes that most often appear in tragedies: justice, democratic participation, opinion,
dilemmas before a decision is made, war and peace.
But, as Edith Hall remarks, in the same collection of essays,47 the mode of democratic
thinking in the plays was far more advanced than the reality of the society which
produced the tragedy. In the world of tragedy, all people, regardless of ethnicity, gender
or social status, can express their opinions with isêgoria and parrhêsia, capabilities that
only men-citizens enjoyed in real Athens. The role of tragedy in the democratic paideia
of the Greeks is also explored by Arlene Saxonhouse who points out that tragedies “…
investigate the difficulties egalitarianism poses for their political regime, not in order to
denigrate that regime but to reveal the contradictions and tensions entailed in any efforts
to build on egalitarian principles.”48
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Above all, however, tragedy expressed the ontological foundations of Greek society, by
highlighting particularly the fact that humans, including the Athenians dêmos, cannot
have full control of the consequences of their actions and that they are prone to hubris.
This constituted a universal perspective through which the cultural ‘other’ was viewed
too, as is the case, for example, of Aeschylus’ Persians, presented first in 472 BCE, in
City Dionysia. The tragedy recollects the defeat of the Persian emperor Xerxes and his
massive army after their 480/79 BCE expedition against Greece.
The tragedy is about the sufferings and the devastation of the enemy, which thus faced
the nemesis that the hubris of Xerxes caused, who mobilized his entire army for his
overambitious endeavor to conquer Greece but finally destroyed his own people.
Through the dialogues between his mother Atossa and the ghost of his father Darius, as
well as between Atossa, Xerxes and the chorus, who lament the Persian defeat,
Aeschylus puts himself and the Greek audience in the place of the ‘other’, even if they
fought in that war against their major enemy.
In Euripides’ Trojan Women, presented in 415 BCE, it is the hubris of the Athenians
against the ‘other’ that is castigated. The tragedy is about the eventual destruction and
conquest of Troy by the Greeks, who killed most of the men and were to take the women
and their families as slaves back to Greece. The real issue, however, to which the play
indirectly referred, was the Athenian invasion, the year before, of the island of Melos.
The tragedy was a condemnation of the Athenians’ cruelty, written by an Athenian poet
and presented to the Athenian audience — an audience open to self-reflection and ready
to face its own hubris — which also granted him a prize.
But the Athenian audience was also open to self-reflection through another theatrical
creation of the time: comedy. Comic plays satirized institutions of the polis, the
political life of the time, public figures, social classes, and even gods, by making up
grotesque situations.
In Lysistrata, Ekklêsiazusae and Thesmophoriazusae,
Aristophanes parodies established gender roles and envisages a society in which women
come to political power to bring about peace and full economic and gender equality; in
The Wasps and The Knights, he challenges demagoguery and abuse of political and
judicial powers; in Plutus, he castigates the unjust distribution of wealth; and with
Peace and The Acharnians, he mocks warmongering and appeals for peace amidst the
Peloponnesian War. As Burckhardt writes: “Other periods of history have left satiric
self-portraits but none so grandiose and concrete as that of Aristophanes’ comedy.”49
In addition, the author emphasizes the remarkable fact that this self-parody was
acceptable even in the middle of a fierce war:
49

Jacob Burckhardt, History of Greek Culture (New York: Dover Publications, [1958] 2002), 261.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol85/iss85/9

16

Moutsios: The Ancient Greek Roots of Cross-Cultural Comparison

Comparative Civilizations Review

95

[. . .] there was an Athens that enjoyed placing its eyes at the focus of this mirror.
Whereas the French Revolution would have lopped off the head of anyone who cast
the slightest doubt on the value of its passionate enthusiasms or dared to portray
them as grotesque, Athens lived her mad life, desiring to know how she appeared
in the eyes of her great poets and allowing them a high degree of independence in
their views, often no doubt minority views.50
Indeed, the Athenians willingly looked into the mirror through the works of their poets,
their philosophers, their historians, the deliberative practice of politics, and the
comparison with other societies.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the naming of foreign peoples as ‘barbarians’, and contrary to the
misunderstandings and the stereotypical way by which this distinction has very often
been used, Ancient Greece appears as the first society that conceived of itself as equal
and, simply, as different amongst the other contemporary societies.
The Greeks recognized the common traits of human nature, but they did not expect
other peoples to be sharing their own worldviews and institutions. Thus, the barbarians
enjoy and suffer, succeed and fail, act with judgement or in hubris, as the Greeks do.
At the same time, the barbarians are not an undifferentiated ‘other’; they have distinct
cultures and their own representations and institutions about and from which the Greeks
can learn.
The paper discussed the Greeks’ impartial comparative gaze towards other civilizations,
in relation to their ontological understanding of the world, and with respect to the
domains of epistêmê, politics, and paideia, all operating in the field of logos, which
underpinned the life of the democratic polis.
The absence of divine anthropogenesis, of any apocalyptic truth, and, ultimately, the
absence of any predetermined meaning lie behind the Greeks’ remarkable relativization
of the world, and their acknowledgement that each people institutes societies in their
own particular way, or, as Castoriadis expressed it, that each people creates arbitrarily
their own convention of how to co-exist with the abyss. Part of the same ontological
notion was not the complete absence but the limitation of the idea of progress into the
areas of material and technical advancement, rather than its application to ethics,
culture, and society in general.
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In other words, although there may be a common trajectory regarding the technical
means of comfort, production, and destruction, progress does not constitute the gauge
by which other peoples are classified and hierarchized. All peoples create their own
cultures and traditions, which the Greeks sought to know about.
Primarily, they sought to know their own traditions and beliefs, and placed them under
philosophical inquiry, which generated epistêmê, as a form and activity in the field of
logos, advanced empirical inquiry, logical argumentation and the search for truth. This
high esteem for intellectual activity gave rise to a genuine curiosity about other cultures,
an activity associated with the ethos of philosophical critique that characterized the
democratic polis.
The questioning of its laws and institutions, and its related values and practices, with
isêgoria and parrhêsia, was, also, part of politics, which, in turn, was associated with
the effort of the first historians to reflect on home institutions by researching those of
others.
The Greeks recognized cultural diversity as they recognized the multiplicity and
equality of views in the framework of the democratic polis. As there can be a different
doxa about the same issue amongst interlocutors, so can other cultures have different
worldviews.
Finally, the development of the Greeks’ impartial comparative gaze towards other
societies was at the center of their paideia that included philosophical and empirical
inquiry, political activity, sophist education, and the artistic life of the polis.
The Greek paideia created a legacy of approaching the cultural ‘other’ with a curiosity
to learn about them and through this knowledge to learn about one’s own self, and with
an impartial attitude that acknowledged both the universality and the particularity of the
human condition. We had to wait until the European Enlightenment to find again this
intellectual attitude, which, although it has been thereafter registered in cross-cultural
studies, has never been prevalent.
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